of the
regular Confederate navy never exceeded four thousand at any one time.
The irregular forces afloat often did gallant, and sometimes even
skillful, service in little isolated ways. But when massed together
they were always at sixes and sevens; and they could never do more
than make the best of a very bad business indeed. The Secretary of
the Confederate navy, Stephen R. Mallory, was not to blame. He was
one of the very few civilians who understood and tried to follow
any naval principles at all. He had done good work as chairman of
the Naval Committee in the Senate before the war, and had learnt
a good deal more than his Northern rival, Gideon Welles. He often
saw what should have been done. But men and means were lacking.

Men and means were also lacking in the naval North at the time
the war began. But the small regular navy was invincible against
next to none; and it enjoyed many means of expansion denied to
the South.

On the outbreak of hostilities the United States Navy had ninety
ships and about nine thousand men--all ranks and ratings (with
marines) included. The age of steam had come. But fifty vessels
had no steam at all. Of the rest one was on the Lakes, five were
quite unserviceable, and thirty-four were scattered about the world
without the slightest thought of how to mobilize a fleet at home.
The age of ironclads had begun already overseas. But in his report
to Congress on July 4, 1861, Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy,
only made some wholly non-committal observations in ponderous
"officialese." In August he appointed a committee which began its
report in September with the sage remark that "Opinions differ
amongst naval and scientific men as to the policy of adopting the
iron armament for ships-of-war." In December Welles transmitted this
report to Congress with the still sager remark that "The subject
of iron armature for ships is one of great general interest, not
only to the navy and country, but is engaging the attention of the
civilized world." Such was the higher administrative preparation
for the ironclad battle of the following year.

It was the same in everything. The people had taken no interest in
the navy and Congress had faithfully represented them by denying
the service all chance of preparing for war till after war had
broken out. Then there was the usual hurry and horrible waste.
Fortunately for all concerned, Gideon Welles, after vainly groping
about the administrative maz