al Commander-in-Chief the Southern
cause had been lost already. Lincoln's war statesmanship grew with
the war. Davis remained as he was.
Lincoln had to meet the difficulties that always occur when
professionals and amateurs are serving together. How much Lincoln,
Stanton, professionals, and amateurs had to do with the system that
was evolved under great stress is far too complex for discussion
here. Suffice it to say this: Lincoln's clear insight and openness
of mind enabled him to see the universal truth, that, other things
being equal, the trained and expert professional must excel the
untrained and inexpert amateur. But other things are never precisely
equal; and a war in which the whole mass-manhood is concerned brings
in a host of amateurs. Lincoln was as devoid of prejudice against
the regular officers as he was against any other class of men; and
he was ready to try and try again to find a satisfactory commander
among them, in spite of many failures. The plan of campaign proposed
by General Winfield Scott (and ultimately carried out in a modified
form) was dubbed by wiseacre public men the "Anaconda policy"; witlings
derided it, and the people were too impatient for anything except "On
to Richmond!" Scott, unable to take the field at seventy-five, had
no second-in-command. Halleck was a very poor substitute later on.
In the meantime McDowell was chosen and generously helped by Lincoln
and Stanton. But after Bull Run the very people whose impatience
made victory impossible howled him down.
Then the choice fell on McClellan, whose notorious campaign fills
much of our next chapter. There we shall see how refractory
circumstances, Stanton's waywardness among them, forced Lincoln
to go beyond the limits of civil control. Here we need only note
McClellan's personal relations with the President. Instead of summoning
him to the White House Lincoln often called at McClellan's for
discussion. McClellan presently began to treat Lincoln's questions
as intrusions, and one day sent down word that he was too tired to
see the President. Lincoln had told a friend that he would hold
McClellan's stirrups for the sake of victory. But he could not
abdicate in favor of McClellan or any one else.
It was none of Lincoln's business to be an actual Commander-in-Chief.
Yet night after weary night he sat up studying the science and art
of war, groping his untutored way toward those general principles
and essential human facts which h
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