estion in mental philosophy to be treated by
the methods of natural science, that I shall approach the discussion of
the religious sentiment. As it is a part, or at least a manifestation of
mind, I must preface its more particular consideration with some words
on the mind in general, words which I shall make as few and as clear as
possible.

At the beginning of this century, the naturalist Oken hazarded the
assertion: "The human mind is a memberment of infusorial
sensation,"[7-1] a phrase which has been the guiding principle of
scientific psychology ever since. That in the course of this memberment
or growth wholly new faculties are acquired, is conceded. As the union
of two inorganic substances may yield a third different in every respect
from either; or, as in the transition of inorganic to organic matter,
the power of reproduction is attained; so, positively new powers may
attend the development of mind. From sensations it progresses to
emotions, from emotions to reason. The one is the psychical climax of
the other. "We have still to do with the one mind,whose[TN-2] action
developes itself with perception, through discrimination, till it
arrives at notions, wherein its most general scheme, 'truth and error,'
serves as the principle."[8-1]

Extravagant as Oken's expression seemed to many when it was published,
it now falls short of the legitimate demands of science, and I may add,
of religion. _Mind is co-extensive with organism_; in the language of
logic, one "connotes" the other; this statement, and nothing short of
it, satisfies the conditions of the problem. Wherever we see Form
preserved amid the change of substance, _there_ is mind; it alone can
work that miracle; only it gives Life. Matter suffers no increase;
therefore the new is but a redistribution of the old; it is new in
_form_ only; and the maintenance of form under changes of substance is
the one distinguishing mark of organism. To it is added the yet more
wonderful power of transmitting form by reproduction. Wherever these
are, are also the rudiments of mind. The distinction between the animal
and the vegetable worlds, between the reasoning and unreasoning animals,
is one of degree only. Whether, in a somewhat different sense, we should
not go yet further, and say that mind is co-extensive with motion, and
hence with phenomena, is a speculative inquiry which may have to be
answered in the affirmative, but it does not concern us here.

The first and m