hat he learn just
that one part of the whole machinery which falls to him to handle; he
must be acquainted with the mutual relations of the other parts to his
own and to the whole, at least in great measure. Such knowledge is
essential even to the full and intelligent discharge of his own duty,
not to speak of the fact that in battle every man should be ready to
supply the place of another of his own class and grade who has been
disabled. Unless this be so, the ship will be very far short of her
best efficiency.

Now, to possess such proficiency in the handling of naval material for
war, and in playing an intelligent part in the general functioning of
a ship in action, much time is required. Time is required to obtain
it, further time is needed in order to retain it; and such time, be it
more or less, is time lost for other purposes,--lost both to the
individual and to the community. When you have your thoroughly
efficient man-of-war's man, you cannot store him as you do your guns
and ammunition, or lay him up as you may your ships, without his
deteriorating at a rate to which material presents no parallel. On the
other hand, if he be retained, voluntarily or otherwise, in the naval
service, there ensues the economical loss--the loss of productive
power--which constitutes the great argument against large standing
armies and enforced military service, advanced by those to whom the
productive energies of a country outweigh all other considerations.

It is this difficulty which is felt most by those responsible for the
military readiness of European states, and which therefore has engaged
their most anxious attention. The providing of material of war is an
onerous money question; but it is simple, and has some compensation
for the expense in the resulting employment of labor for its
production. It is quite another matter to have ready the number of men
needed,--to train them, and to keep them so trained as to be available
immediately.

The solution is sought in a tax upon time--Upon the time of the
nation, economically lost to production, and upon the time of the
individual, lost out of his life. Like other taxes, the tendency on
all sides is to reduce this as far as possible,--to compromise between
ideal proficiency for probable contingencies, and the actual demands
of the existing and usual conditions of peace. Although inevitable,
the compromise is unsatisfactory, and yields but partial results in
either direction.