delay, I waited on this Minister
immediately on his return to Court, and observed to him that the most
important decisions relative to the common cause of France and America
had been suspended on account of his absence; urged him particularly
on the great point of a naval superiority, reminding him, that the
British Marine was the principal instrument of their power; that the
efforts of the allies to reduce this force could nowhere be made with
such a prospect of success as on the American coast; that it would be
very easy after a decisive campaign in America, in which his personal
glory was so much interested, to transport a sufficient force from the
continent to reduce any British island; that in the mean time the
French islands would be in the most perfect security. He repeated
nearly what he had said at our first interview, with stronger
assurances of his prospect of a naval superiority the ensuing
campaign.

In a word I used every argument of national interest, and added such
personal motives as I thought applicable to the different Ministers.

On the 8th of April Count de Vergennes communicated to me his Most
Christian Majesty's determination to become security for a loan of ten
millions of livres, to be opened on account of the United States in
Holland; that he had immediately despatched a courier extraordinary to
M. de la Vauguyon with a letter relative to this business; that I had
reason to be satisfied with this in addition to the donation of six
millions, and four millions that had been appropriated to the payment
of bills drawn on Mr Franklin. I pressed him by many arguments to
leave an opening for the remaining five millions; exposed the false
policy of incomplete succors; observed that Congress had solicited no
more than was necessary; that there should be no other limits to the
present succor than the invincible bounds of possibility; that it was
not the condition on which the money was obtained, but the sum and
opportuneness of remitting it, that were above all important; that in
this point of view I would prefer converting the donation into a loan,
if it would make the advance more convenient to the French finances,
and facilitate the augmentation of the total sum, destined for the
United States. I repeated the same thing to the Director-General of
Finance, but their answer was, the King had passed his word and could
not retract.

I entreated both M. de Vergennes and M. Necker not to abandon the
Un