otect that country
from farther attempts at invasion by the before-mentioned powers; that
for the speedy regulation of the internal affairs of Greece, and the
support of your authority, it would be far preferable and infinitely
less costly for the mediating powers to place in your hands the means of
maintaining four or five thousand troops, together with five hundred
seamen, and apply a portion of the vast sums they will save to the
education of the rising generation of Greeks abroad and at home, and to
the encouragement of whatever will tend to direct the talent and genius
of the young people most speedily into the course which will entitle
Greece to rank amongst the civilized nations of Europe. Whether this
advice shall be listened to or not, I am satisfied that my opinion is
correct, and that a multitude of foreign troops, in the pay of rival
foreign nations, would contribute less to the objects these nations
profess to have in view than a much smaller force under your own
authority, more especially when it is considered that these troops could
in no way interfere with the internal arrangement and police of the
country, unless by usurping, or at least superseding the authority which
ought to be exclusively vested in your excellency as chief of the Greek
Government. Besides, knowing, as I do, the jealous character of your
countrymen, the facility with which they listen to surmises and reports,
the diversity of interests amongst the rival chiefs, and the intrigues
practised by base and worthless individuals, I have little doubt but
that such mixture of troops of different nations would give rise to a
state of anarchy more injurious to Greece than that which at present
exists. Whether such anarchy might be prevented by one nation alone
taking upon itself the internal arrangement of Greece seems doubtful;
for, to enforce laws, however just and necessary, by troops in foreign
pay, against the opinion and habits of a people who have no just notion
of the reciprocal duties of civilized society, would be in their
estimation to erect a military despotism, and would call forth
resistance on their part even to the most salutary changes. I have also
recommended, as an additional security against a multitude of evils, an
immediate demarkation of the boundaries of Greece, or, at least, an
acknowledgment of your excellency as President. The outfit of two or
three steam-vessels still unfinished is going on, and I shall find means
to