f
the immigrants. The Dutch of both communities had nothing to gain and
something to lose by the maladministration of the Transvaal, so that
they were nowise disposed to support it in refusing reforms. The only
thing that would make them rally to it would be a menace to its
independence, regarding which they, and especially the Free State
people, were extremely sensitive. Plainly, therefore, unless the
colonial Dutch were to be incensed and the Free State men turned to
enemies, such a menace was to be avoided.

Finally, the British authorities were bound to make sure, not only that
they had an adequate _casus belli_ which they could present to their own
people and to the world, but also that the gain to be expected from
immediately redressing the grievances of the Uitlander outweighed the
permanent evils war would entail. Even where, according to the usage of
nations, a just cause for war exists, even where victory in the war may
be reckoned on, the harm to be expected may be greater than the fruits
of victory. Here the harm was evident. The cost of equipping a large
force and transporting it across many thousand miles of sea was the
smallest part of the harm. The alienation of more than half the
population of Cape Colony, the destruction of a peaceful and prosperous
Republic with which Britain had no quarrel, the responsibility for
governing the Transvaal when conquered, with its old inhabitants
bitterly hostile, these were evils so grave, that the benefits to be
secured to the Uitlanders might well seem small in comparison. A nation
is, no doubt, bound to protect its subjects. But it could hardly be said
that the hardships of this group of subjects, which did not prevent
others from flocking into the country, and which were no worse than they
had been for some time previously, were such as to forbid the exercise
of a little more patience. It was said by the war party among the
English in South Africa that patience was being mistaken for weakness,
and that the credit of Britain was being lowered all over the world, and
even among the peoples of India, by her forbearance towards the
Transvaal. Absurd as this notion may appear, it was believed by heated
partizans on the spot. But outside Africa, and especially in Europe, the
forbearance of one of the four greatest Powers in the world towards a
community of seventy thousand people was in no danger of being
misunderstood.

Whether the force of these considerations, obvio