n are most distrest by unjust
actions; the brave with the cowardly; the virtuous with the
profligate; and, therefore, this is the characteristic of a
well-regulated mind, both to be well pleased with what is excellent
and to be distrest with what is contrary. Wherefore, if trouble of
mind befall a wise man (and assuredly it will, unless we suppose that
all humanity is extirpated from his mind), what reason is there why we
should altogether remove friendship from life, lest because of it we
should take upon ourselves some troubles? for what difference is
there (setting the emotions of the mind aside), I do not say between a
man and a beast, but between a man and a stone, or log, or anything of
that kind? For they do not deserve to be listened to who would have
virtue to be callous and made of iron, as it were, which indeed is, as
in other matters, so in friendship also, tender and susceptible; so
that friends are loosened, as it were, by happy events, and drawn
together by distresses.

Wherefore the anxiety which has often to be felt for a friend is not
of such force that it should remove friendship from the world, any
more than that the virtues, because they bring with them certain cares
and troubles, should therefore be discarded. For when it produces
friendship (as I said above), should any indication of virtue shine
forth, to which a congenial mind may attach and unite itself--when
this happens, affection must necessarily arise. For what is so
unmeaning as to take delight in many vain things, such as preferments,
glory, magnificent buildings, clothing and adornment of the body, and
not to take an extreme delight in a soul endued with virtue, in such a
soul as can either love or (so to speak) love in return? for there is
nothing more delightful than the repayment of kindness and the
interchange of devotedness and good offices. Now if we add this, which
may with propriety be added, that nothing so allures and draws any
object to itself as congeniality does friendship, it will of course be
admitted as true that the good must love the good, and unite them to
them selves, just as if connected by relationship and nature; for
nothing is more apt to seek and seize on its like than nature.
Wherefore this certainly is clear, Fannius and Scaevola (in my
opinion), that among the good a liking for the good is, as it were,
inevitable; and this indeed is appointed by Nature herself as the very
fountain of friendship.

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