n as the two armies have met, to attack Caesar's
right wing on the flank, and enclosing their army on the rear throw
them into disorder, and put them to the rout, before we shall throw a
weapon against the enemy. By this means we shall put an end to the
war, without endangering the legions, and almost without a blow. Nor
is this a difficult matter, as we far outnumber them in cavalry." At
the same time, he gave them notice to be ready for battle on the day
following, and since the opportunity which they had so often wished
for was now arrived, not to disappoint the opinion generally
entertained of their experience and valor....

Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the tenth legion on the
right, the ninth on the left, altho it was very much weakened by the
battles at Dyrrachium.[48] He placed the eighth legion so close to the
ninth as almost to make one of the two, and ordered them to support
each other. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making a total of
twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp. He
gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P.
Sulla, and of the center to Cn. Domitius; he himself took his post
opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of
the enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing
might be surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a
single cohort from each of the legions composing the third line,
formed of them a fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry,
and, acquainting them with his wishes, admonished them that the
success of that day depended on their courage. At the same time, he
ordered the third line and the entire army not to charge without his
command; that he would give the signal whenever he wished them to do
so....

But our men, when the signal was given, rushed forward with their
javelins ready to be launched, but perceiving that Pompey's men did
not run to meet their charge, having acquired experience by custom,
and being practised in former battles, they of their own accord
repressed their speed, and halted almost midway, that they might not
come up with the enemy when their strength was exhausted, and after a
short respite they again renewed their course, and threw their
javelins, and instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them.
Nor did Pompey's men fail in this crisis, for they received our
javelins, stood our charge, and maintained their ranks; an