ife is the real community of men. Just as the isolation from
this body is more complete, more painful, more to be feared, more
contradictory than is isolation from the political community, so too
the removal of this isolation, and even a partial reaction, a revolt
against the same, are tasks all the more infinite as man is more
infinite than the citizen, and human life than political life. However
partial the industrial revolt may be, it conceals within itself a
universal soul: political revolt may be never so universal but it
hides a narrow-minded spirit under the most colossal form.

"Prussian" worthily closes his article with the following phrase: "A
social revolution without a political soul (that is, without organized
insight from the standpoint of the whole) is impossible."

We have seen that a social revolution maybe considered to be from the
standpoint of the whole because, even if it only occurs in a factory
district, it is a protest of men against degraded life, because it
proceeds from the standpoint of the real individual, because the
community against whose separation from himself the individual reacts,
is the real community of men, the civic community.

The political soul of a revolution, on the other hand, consists in the
endeavour of the classes without political influence to abolish their
isolation from the community and from government. Their standpoint is
that of the State, an abstract whole, which exists only in and through
its separation from real life, which is unthinkable without the
organized antagonism between the general idea and the individual
existence of man. Consequently a revolution of political souls
organizes a ruling clique in society, in accordance with the limited
and doubly-cleft nature of these souls, at the cost of society.

We should like to confide to "Prussian" what a "social revolution with
a political soul" is; we should like at the same time to suggest to
him that not once has he been able to raise himself above the
restricted political standpoint.

A "social" revolution with a political soul is either a composite
absurdity, if "Prussian" means by "social" revolution a social
revolution in contrast to a political, and yet invests the social
revolution with a political, instead of a social, soul. Or a "social
revolution with a political soul" is nothing but what is otherwise
called a "political revolution" or a "revolution pure and simple."

Every revolution dissolves th