ATION.

Because existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
verity, and, therefore, cannot be explained by duration, even
though the duration be without beginning or end.

So far the definitions; then follow the

AXIOMS.

1. All things that exist, exist either of themselves or in
virtue of something else.
2. What we cannot conceive of as existing in virtue of
something else, we must conceive through and in itself.
3. From a given cause an effect necessarily follows, and
if there be no given cause no effect can follow.
4. Things which have nothing in common with each other
cannot be understood through one another; i.e. the
conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.
5. To understand an effect implies that we understand
the cause of it.
6. A true idea is one which corresponds with its ideate.
7. The essence of anything which can be conceived as
non-existent does not involve existence.

Such is our metaphysical outfit of simple ideas with
which to start upon our enterprise of learning, the larger
number of which, so far from being simple, must be
absolutely without meaning to persons whose minds are
undisciplined in metaphysical abstraction, and which
become only intelligible propositions as we look back
upon them after having become acquainted with the
system which they are supposed to contain.

Although, however, we may justly quarrel with such
unlooked-for difficulties, the important question, after
all, is not of their obscurity but of their truth. Many
things in all the sciences are obscure to an unpractised
understanding, which are true enough and clear
enough to people acquainted with the subjects, and
may be fairly laid as foundations of a scientific system,
although rudimentary students must be contented to
accept them upon faith. Of course it is entirely
competent to Spinoza, or to any one, to define the terms
which he intends to use just as he pleases, provided
it be understood that any conclusions which he derives
out of them apply only to the ideas so defined, and not
to any supposed object existing which corresponds with
them. Euclid defines his triangles and circles, and
discovers that to figures so described certain properties
previously unknown may be proved to belong; but as
in nature there are no such things as triangles and
circles exactly answering the definition, his conclusions,
as applied to actually existing objects, are either not
true at all or only prox