estions of this type would react beneficially upon the
methods of instruction. They would tend to place a premium upon that
type of instruction that develops initiative in solving problems,
instead of encouraging the memoriter methods that tend to crush whatever
germs of initiative the pupil may possess. This does not mean that the
memoriter work should be excluded. A solid basis of fact is essential to
the mastery of principles. Personally I believe that the work of the
intermediate grades should be planned to give the pupil this factual
basis. This would leave the upper grades free for the more rational
work. In any case, I believe that the efficiency of examinations may be
greatly increased by giving one or two questions that must be answered
by a reasoning process for every question that may be answered by verbal
memory alone.

IV

Thus far it seems clear that an absolute standard is available for
testing the efficiency of training or habit building, and that a fairly
accurate standard may be developed for testing the efficiency of
instruction. Both training and instruction, however, are subject to the
modifying influence of a third factor of which too little account has
hitherto been taken in educational discussions. Training results in
habits, and yet a certain sort of training may not only result in a
certain type of habit, but it may also result in the development of
something which will quite negate the habit that has been developed. In
the process of developing habits of neatness, for example, one may
employ methods that result in prejudicing the child against neatness as
a general virtue. In this event, although the little specific habits of
neatness may function in the situations in which they have been
developed, the prejudice will effectually prevent their extension to
other fields. In other words, the general emotional effect of training
must be considered as well as the specific results of the training. The
same stricture applies with equal force to instruction. Instruction
imparts knowledge; but if a man knows and fails to feel, his knowledge
has little influence upon his conduct.

This factor that controls conduct when habit fails, this factor that may
even negate an otherwise efficient habit, is the great indeterminate in
the work of teaching. To know that one has trained an effective habit or
imparted a practical principle is one thing; to know that in doing this,
one has not engendered in the p