1763, there was
nothing at all on which to fix a basis of compensation from reciprocal
cession of conquests. They were all on one side. The question with us
was not what we were to receive, and on what consideration, but what we
were to keep for indemnity or to cede for peace. Accordingly, no place
being left for barter, sacrifices were made on our side to peace; and we
surrendered to the French their most valuable possessions in the West
Indies without any equivalent. The rest of Europe fell soon after into
its ancient order; and the German war ended exactly where it had begun.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was built upon a similar basis. All the
conquests in Europe had been made by France. She had subdued the
Austrian Netherlands, and broken open the gates of Holland. We had taken
nothing in the West Indies; and Cape Breton was a trifling business
indeed. France gave up all for peace. The Allies had given up all that
was ceded at Utrecht. Louis the Fourteenth made all, or nearly all, the
cessions at Ryswick, and at Nimeguen. In all those treaties, and in all
the preceding, as well as in the others which intervened, the question
never had been that of barter. The balance of power had been ever
assumed as the known common law of Europe at all times and by all
powers: the question had only been (as it must happen) on the more or
less inclination of that balance.

This general balance was regarded in four principal points of view: the
GREAT MIDDLE BALANCE, which comprehended Great Britain, France, and
Spain; the BALANCE OF THE NORTH; the BALANCE, external and internal, of
GERMANY; and the BALANCE OF ITALY. In all those systems of balance,
England was the power to whose custody it was thought it might be most
safely committed.

France, as she happened to stand, secured the balance or endangered it.
Without question, she had been long the security for the balance of
Germany, and, under her auspices, the system, if not formed, had been at
least perfected. She was so in some measure with regard to Italy, more
than occasionally. She had a clear interest in the balance of the North,
and had endeavored to preserve it. But when we began to treat with the
present France, or, more properly, to prostrate ourselves to her, and to
try if we should be admitted to ransom our allies, upon a system of
mutual concession and compensation, we had not one of the usual
facilities. For, first, we had not the smallest indication of a desire