h have been beaten in the old
course of political communication between mankind, but out of the ways
even of the most common prudence. Against all rules, after we had met
nothing but rebuffs in return to all our proposals, we made _two
confidential communications_ to those in whom we had no confidence and
who reposed no confidence in us. What was worse, we were fully aware of
the madness of the step we were taking. Ambassadors are not sent to a
hostile power, persevering in sentiments of hostility, to make candid,
confidential, and amicable communications. Hitherto the world has
considered it as the duty of an ambassador in such a situation to be
cautious, guarded, dexterous, and circumspect. It is true that mutual
confidence and common interest dispense with all rules, smooth the
rugged way, remove every obstacle, and make all things plain and level.
When, in the last century, Temple and De Witt negotiated the famous
Triple Alliance, their candor, their freedom, and the most
_confidential_ disclosures were the result of true policy. Accordingly,
in spite of all the dilatory forms of the complex government of the
United Provinces, the treaty was concluded in three days. It did not
take a much longer time to bring the same state (that of Holland)
through a still more complicated transaction,--that of the _Grand
Alliance_. But in the present case, this unparalleled candor, this
unpardonable want of reserve, produced, what might have been expected
from it, the most serious evils. It instructed the enemy in the whole
plan of our demands and concessions. It made the most fatal discoveries.

And first, it induced us to lay down the basis of a treaty which itself
had nothing to rest upon. It seems, we thought we had gained a great
point in getting this basis admitted,--that is, a basis of mutual
compensation and exchange of conquests. If a disposition to peace, and
with any reasonable assurance, had been previously indicated, such a
plan of arrangement might with propriety and safety be proposed; because
these arrangements were not, in effect, to make the basis, but a part of
the superstructure, of the fabric of pacification. The order of things
would thus be reversed. The mutual disposition to peace would form the
reasonable base, upon which the scheme of compensation upon one side or
the other might be constructed. This truly fundamental base being once
laid, all differences arising from the spirit of huckstering and barter