exact
amount of oppression which will render a nation incapable of resistance,
and relieve the conqueror of trouble in his work of building up a
puissant kingdom for his own aggrandizement.

[1] It is fair to call attention to the strong expressions used
by Machiavelli in the _Discorsi_, lib. i. cap. 18 and cap. 26,
on the infamies and inhumanities to which the aspirant after
tyranny is condemned.

What Machiavelli says about mixed principalities is pointed by a
searching critique of the Italian policy of Louis XII. The French king
had well-known claims upon the Duchy of Milan, which the Venetians urged
him to make good. They proposed to unite forces and to divide the
conquered province of Lombardy. Machiavelli does not blame Louis for
accepting this offer and acting in concert with the Republic. His
mistakes began the moment after he had gained possession of Milan,
Genoa, and the majority of the North Italian cities. It was then his
true policy to balance Venice against Rome, to assume the protectorate
of the minor states, and to keep all dangerous rivals out of Italy.
Instead of acting thus, he put Romagna into the hands of the Pope and
divided Naples with the King of Spain. 'Louis indeed,' concludes
Machiavelli, 'was guilty of five capital errors: he destroyed the hopes
of his numerous and weak allies; he increased the power, already too
great, of the Papacy; he introduced a foreign potentate; he neglected to
reside in Italy; he founded no colonies for the maintenance of his
authority. If I am told that Louis acted thus imprudently toward
Alexander and Ferdinand in order to avoid a war, I answer that in each
case the mistake was as bad as any war could be in its results. If I am
reminded of his promise to the Pope, I reply that princes ought to know
how and when to break their faith, as I intend to prove. When I was at
Nantes, the Cardinal of Rouen told me that the Italians did not know how
to conduct a war: I retorted that the French did not understand
statecraft, or they would not have allowed the Church to gain so much
power in Italy. Experience showed that I was right; for the French
wrought their own ruin by aggrandizing the Papacy and introducing Spain
into the realm of Naples.'

This criticism contains the very essence of political sagacity. It lays
bare the secret of the failure of the French under Charles, under Louis,
and under Francis, to establish themselves in Italy. Expeditions of
p