lorentine speak prologue to the _Jew of Malta_ thus--

I count religion but a childish toy,
And hold there is no sin but ignorance.

When the Counter-reformation had begun in Italy, and desperate efforts
were being made to check the speculative freedom of the Renaissance, the
_Principe_ was condemned by the Inquisition. Meanwhile it was whispered
that the Spanish princes, and the sons of Catherine de' Medici upon the
throne of France, conned its pages just as a manual of toxicology might
be studied by a Marquise de Brinvilliers. Machiavelli became the
scapegoat of great political crimes; and during the religious wars of
the sixteenth century there were not wanting fanatics who ascribed such
acts of atrocity as the Massacre of S. Bartholomew to his venomous
influence. Yet this book was really nothing more or less than a critical
compendium of facts respecting Italy, a highly condensed abstract of
political experience. In it as in a mirror we may study the lineaments
of the Italian despot who by adventure or by heritage succeeded to the
conduct of a kingdom. At the same time the political principles here
established are those which guided the deliberations of the Venetian
Council and the Papal Court, no less than the actions of a Sforza or a
Borgia upon the path to power. It is therefore a document of the very
highest value for the illustration of the Italian conscience in relation
to political morality.

The _Principe_ opens with the statement that all forms of government may
be classified as republics or as principalities. Of the latter some are
hereditary, others acquired. Of the principalities acquired in the
lifetime of the ruler some are wholly new, like Milan under Francesco
Sforza; others are added of hereditary kingdoms, like Naples to Spain.
Again, such acquired states have been previously accustomed either to
the rule of a single man or to self-government. Finally they are won
either with the conqueror's own or with borrowed armies, either by
fortune or by ability.[1] Thus nine conditions under which
principalities may be considered are established at the outset.

[1] The word Virtu, which I have translated ability, is almost
equivalent to the Greek [Greek: _arete_], before it had
received a moral definition, or to the Roman Virtus. It is very
far, as will be gathered from the sequel of the _Principe_,
from denoting what we mean by Virtue.

The short chapter devoted by Machiavelli t