which the candidates for office were selected, while
proscriptive measures of various degrees of rigor excluded their enemies
from participation in the government.[1] At length in 1480 the whole
machinery of the republic was suspended by Lorenzo de' Medici in favor
of the Board of Seventy, whom he nominated, and with whom, acting like a
Privy Council, he administered the state.[2] It is clear that this
revolution could never have been effected without a succession of coups
d'etat. The instrument for their accomplishment lay ready to the hands
of the Medicean party in the pernicious system of the Parlamento and
Balia, by means of which the people, assembled from time to time in the
public square, and intimidated by the reigning faction, intrusted full
powers to a select committee nominated in private by the chiefs of the
great house.[3] It is also clear that so much political roguery could
not have been successful without an extensive demoralization of the
upper rank of citizens. The Medici in effect bought and sold the honor
of the public officials, lent money, jobbed posts of profit, and winked
at peculation, until they had created a sufficient body of _ames
damnees_, men who had everything to gain by a continuance of their
corrupt authority. The party so formed, including even such
distinguished citizens as the Guicciardini, Baccio Valori, and Francesco
Vettori, proved the chief obstacle to the restoration of Florentine
liberty in the sixteenth century.

[1] What Machiavelli says (_Ist. Fior._ vii. 1) about the arts of
Cosimo contains the essence of the policy by which the Medici rose.
Compare v. 4 and vii. 4-6 for his character of Cosimo. Guicciardini
(_Op. Ined._ vol. ii. p. 68) describes the use made of extraordinary
taxation as a weapon of offense against his enemies, by Cosimo: 'uso
le gravezze in luogo de' pugnali che communemente suole usare chi ha
simili reggimenti nelle mani.' The Marchese Gino Capponi (_Arch.
Stor._ vol. i. pp. 315-20) analyzes the whole Medicean policy in a
critique of great ability.

[2] Guicciardini (_Op. Ined._ vol. ii. pp. 35-49) exposes the
principle and the _modus operandi_ of this Council of Seventy, by
means of which Lorenzo controlled the election of the magistracies,
diverted the public moneys to his own use, and made his will law in
Florence. The councils which he superseded at this date were the
Consiglio del Popolo a