pressing importance has been
quickened by observation of a practical phase of the matter, to which
attention has more than once been called by my predecessors.

The civil list now comprises about 100,000 persons, far the larger part
of whom must, under the terms of the Constitution, be selected by the
President either directly or through his own appointees.

In the early years of the administration of the Government the personal
direction of appointments to the civil service may not have been an
irksome task for the Executive, but now that the burden has increased
fully a hundredfold it has become greater than he ought to bear, and it
necessarily diverts his time and attention from the proper discharge of
other duties no less delicate and responsible, and which in the very
nature of things can not be delegated to other hands.

In the judgment of not a few who have given study and reflection to this
matter, the nation has outgrown the provisions which the Constitution
has established for filling the minor offices in the public service.

But whatever may be thought of the wisdom or expediency of changing the
fundamental law in this regard, it is certain that much relief may be
afforded, not only to the President and to the heads of the Departments,
but to Senators and Representatives in Congress, by discreet
legislation. They would be protected in a great measure by the bill now
pending before the Senate, or by any other which should embody its
important features, from the pressure of personal importunity and from
the labor of examining conflicting claims and pretensions of candidates.

I trust that before the close of the present session some decisive
action may be taken for the correction of the evils which inhere
in the present methods of appointment, and I assure you of my hearty
cooperation in any measures which are likely to conduce to that end.

As to the most appropriate term and tenure of the official life of the
subordinate employees of the Government, it seems to be generally agreed
that, whatever their extent or character, the one should be definite and
the other stable, and that neither should be regulated by zeal in the
service of party or fidelity to the fortunes of an individual.

It matters little to the people at large what competent person is at
the head of this department or of that bureau if they feel assured that
the removal of one and the accession of another will not involve the
retirement o