the tools with which we work, whereby we may lose more than we gain,
if we attempt to apply them in certain situations? If so, there is
always a possibility of improved tools. The Greek philosopher who said
that the only possible subjects of lawsuit were "insult, injury and
homicide," was as dogmatic as Herbert Spencer, who conceived of
sanitary laws and housing laws in our large cities as quite outside
the domain of the legal order. Better legal machinery extends the
field of legal effectiveness as better machinery has extended the
field of industrial effectiveness. I do not mean that the law should
interfere as of course in every human relation and in every situation
where some one chances to think a social want may be satisfied
thereby. Experience has shown abundantly how futile legal machinery
may be in its attempts to secure certain kinds of interests. What I do
say is, that if in any field of human conduct or in any human relation
the law, with such machinery as it has, may satisfy a social want
without a disproportionate sacrifice of other claims, there is no
eternal limitation inherent in the nature of things, there are no
bounds imposed at creation, to stand in the way of its doing so.
Let us apply some of the other theories which are now current. The
Neo-Hegelians say: Try the claims in terms of civilization, in terms
of the development of human powers to the most of which they are
capable--the most complete human mastery of nature, both human nature
and external nature. The Neo-Kantians say: Try them in terms of a
community of free-willing men as the social ideal. Duguit says: Try
them in terms of social interdependence and social function. Do they
promote or do they impede social interdependence through similarity of
interest and division of labor? In these formulas do we really get
away from the problem of a balance compatible with maintaining all the
interests, with responding to all the wants and claims, which are
involved in civilized social existence?
For the purpose of understanding the law of today I am content with a
picture of satisfying as much of the whole body of human wants as we
may with the least sacrifice. I am content to think of law as a social
institution to satisfy social wants--the claims and demands involved
in the existence of civilized society--by giving effect to as much as
we may with the least sacrifice, so far as such wants may be satisfied
or such claims given effect by an ord
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