etting up of administrative tribunals on
every hand and for every purpose. The regulation of public utilities,
apportionment of the use of the water of running streams among
different appropriators, workmen's compensation, the actual duration
and nature of punishment for crime, admission to and practice of
professions and even of trades, the power to enter or to remain in the
country, banking, insurance, unfair competition and restraint of
trade, the enforcement of factory laws, of pure food laws, of housing
laws and of laws as to protection from fire and the relation of
principal and agent, as between farmers and commission merchants, are
but some of the subjects which the living law, the law in action, is
leaving to executive justice in administrative tribunals. To some
extent this is required by the increasing complexity of the social
order and the minute division of labor which it involves. Yet this
complexity and this division of labor developed for generations in
which the common-law jealousy of administration was dominant. Chiefly
our revival of executive justice in the present century is one of
those reversions to justice without law which are perennial in legal
history. As in the case of like reversions in the past it is the
forerunner of growth. It is the first form of reaction from the
overrigid application of law in a period of stability. A bad
adjustment between law and administration and cumbrous, ineffective
and unbusinesslike legal procedure, involving waste of time and money
in the mere etiquette of justice, are doing in our time what like
conditions did in English law in the middle of the sixteenth century.

If we look back at the means of individualizing the application of law
which have developed in our legal system, it will be seen that almost
without exception they have to do with cases involving the moral
quality of individual conduct or of the conduct of enterprises, as
distinguished from matters of property and of commercial law. Equity
uses its powers of individualizing to the best advantage in
connection with the conduct of those in whom trust and confidence have
been reposed. Legal standards are used chiefly in the law of torts, in
the law of public utilities and in the law as to fiduciary relations.
Jury lawlessness is an agency of justice chiefly in connection with
the moral quality of conduct where the special circumstances exclude
that "intelligence without passion" which, according to Ar