we ourselves examined the territory included between the Marne,
the Seine, and a line from Mery-sur-Seine through Arcis to
Vitry-le-Francois, and made certain digressions across the Marne to
the northeast of Paris. We examined the battlefields while they were
comparatively fresh, and supplemented our observations by innumerable
conversations with the French troops and civilians, and with German
prisoners. At the Embassy we obtained from other Attaches many bits of
reliable information about the fighting directly north of Paris and
about the rearguard actions between the Marne and the Aisne.

Up to the time of this battle the German plan of campaign had worked
out almost perfectly. The Franco-German border is due east of Paris,
and the French mobilization took place there behind the fortresses of
Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort.

The Belgian frontier is north of Paris and the unexpected and
treacherous advance of the German armies through that neutral country
brought them immediately behind the French line of mobilization. The
violation of Belgium permitted the Germans to advance into France
before the Allies could reorganize into an effective resistance
against this unexpected attack. It is to be remembered that a
mobilization which it has taken years to plan out and which involves
millions of men and their equipment cannot be changed at a moment's
notice. Had the Germans attacked across the Franco-German border, they
would have found the French army awaiting them behind the fortresses
of Verdun, Toul, and Epinal, and it is almost certain that they would
never have arrived within two hundred marching miles of Paris. No one
knew this better than the German General Staff.

Had it not been for the unexpected and heroic resistance of Belgium,
and the masterly retreat of the small British army, Germany's foul
blow might have resulted in the capture of Paris toward the end of
August. These two things, combined with a desperate retarding action
executed along the Aisne by several French corps, delayed the Germans
long enough to enable General Joffre to organize and fight a single
battle upon which everything was staked. To lose it would have meant
utter ruin, for France has faced no such crisis since Charles Martel
repelled the Saracens at Tours in 732. To win would mean that
the Teutons' blow-below-the-belt had been survived and that a
recommencement of the war upon something like even terms would be
possible.

In prep