definite terms. Lee replied the same evening somewhat
evasively, setting forth that he desired to treat for peace, and that
the surrender of his army would be considered as a means to that end.

To this Grant responded on the 9th, having set his army in motion to
Appomattox Court House, that he had no authority to treat for peace; but
added some plain words to the effect that the shortest road to peace
would be surrender. Lee immediately asked for an interview. Grant
received this communication while on the road, and returned word that he
would push on and meet him wherever he might designate. When Grant
arrived at the village of Appomattox Court House he was directed to a
small house where Lee awaited him. Within a short time the conditions
were drafted by Grant and accepted by Lee, who was grateful that the
officers were permitted to keep their side-arms, and officers and men to
retain the horses which they owned and their private baggage.

The number of men surrendered at Appomattox was 27,416. During the ten
days' previous fighting 22,079 of Lee's army had been captured, and
about 12,000 killed and wounded. It is estimated that as many as 12,000
deserted on the road to Appomattox. From May 1, 1864, to April 9, 1865,
the Armies of the Potomac and the James took 66,512 prisoners and
captured 245 flags, 251 guns, and 22,633 stands of small arms. Their
losses from the Wilderness to Appomattox were 12,561 killed, 64,452
wounded, and 26,988 missing, an aggregate of 104,001.

It would be idle adulation to say that in all points during this long
conflict with Lee General Grant always did the best thing, making no
mistakes. The essential point is, and it suffices to establish, his
military fame on secure foundations, that he made no fatal mistake, that
progress toward the great result in view was constant, slower than he
expected, slower than the country expected, but finally everywhere
victorious, substantially on the lines contemplated in the beginning.
After Lee's experience in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania he seldom
assumed the offensive against Grant. He became prudent, adopted a
defensive policy, fought behind intrenchments or just in front of
fortifications to which he could retire for safety, and waited to be
attacked. Watchful and alert as he was, he was deceived by Grant
oftener than he deceived him, and except that he managed to postpone the
end by skillful tactics, he did not challenge the military superio