t. I find I shall not be able to send a force from
here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will
be independent of mine, at least until the fall of Richmond takes
place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to
protect, could not prevent Hood going north. With Wilson turned
loose with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more
on the defensive than heretofore."

"Sherman to Grant.
"October 11, 1864, 10 A. M.
"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and
Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw
one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I
hold Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and have strong detachments
along my line. These reduce my active force to a comparatively
small army. We cannot remain now on the defensive. With 25,000
men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my road.
I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the
country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city,
send back all my wounded and worthless, and, with my effective
army, move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may
turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced
to follow me. Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on
the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would
have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full 25 per
cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the
Chattahoochee. Answer quick, as I know we will not have the
telegraph long."(10)

"Grant to Sherman.
"October 11, 1864, 11:30 P. M.
"Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip
to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee
firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton
or Chattanooga, as you think best."

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SHERMAN AND THOMAS

"Sherman to Thomas.
"October 20, 1864.
". . . I want all things bent to the following general plan of
action for the next three months. Out of the forces now here and
at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of from 60,000
to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and,
it may be, Savannah and Charleston, but I will always keep open
the alternatives of the mouth of Appalachicola and Mobile. By this
I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South