n that particular;
and, I have reason to believe, will answer even my wishes. All that
remains for me then to wish, to recommend, to inculcate, to order, and to
insist upon, is good-breeding; without which, all your other
qualifications will be lame, unadorned, and to a certain degree
unavailing. And here I fear, and have too much reason to believe, that
you are greatly deficient. The remainder of this letter, therefore, shall
be (and it will not be the last by a great many) upon that subject.

A friend of yours and mine has very justly defined good-breeding to be,
THE RESULT OF MUCH GOOD SENSE, SOME GOOD NATURE, AND A LITTLE SELF-DENIAL
FOR THE SAKE OF OTHERS, AND WITH A VIEW TO OBTAIN THE SAME INDULGENCE
FROM THEM. Taking this for granted (as I think it cannot be disputed), it
is astonishing to me that anybody who has good sense and good nature (and
I believe you have both), can essentially fail in good-breeding. As to
the modes of it, indeed, they vary according to persons, and places, and
circumstances; and are only to be acquired by observation and experience:
but the substance of it is everywhere and eternally the same. Good
manners are, to particular societies, what good morals are to society in
general; their cement and their security. And, as laws are enacted to
enforce good morals, or at least to prevent the ill effects of bad ones;
so there are certain rules of civility, universally implied and received,
to enforce good manners and punish bad ones. And, indeed, there seems to
me to be less difference, both between the crimes and between the
punishments than at first one would imagine. The immoral man, who invades
another man's property, is justly hanged for it; and the ill-bred man,
who, by his ill-manners, invades and disturbs the quiet and comforts of
private life, is by common consent as justly banished society. Mutual
complaisances, attentions, and sacrifices of little conveniences, are as
natural an implied compact between civilized people, as protection and
obedience are between kings and subjects; whoever, in either case,
violates that compact, justly forfeits all advantages arising from it.
For my own part, I really think, that next to the consciousness of doing
a good action, that of doing a civil one is the most pleasing; and the
epithet which I should covet the most, next to that of Aristides, would
be that of well-bred. Thus much for good-breeding in general; I will now
consider some of the various