isciplined and with no leaders, were
struck by panic cowardice and refused to cross to the assistance of
their fellows. Scott behaved with distinguished personal bravery,
rallying his raw troops and leading them in a charge with the bayonet,
always a favorite weapon with him. Nevertheless his forces soon fell
into disorder and were driven over the cliffs to the edge of the
water, where, from lack of boats, most of the men were made prisoners,
Scott among the number. Much difficulty was experienced by the British
officers in preventing the Indians from massacring the prisoners.
Scott was a man of gigantic proportions. This fact, and the reckless
courage with which he had fought, had attracted the attention of the
Indians. Some of them came into the room where he was confined and
attempted to murder him, and only his great strength and quickness
enabled him to beat them off until he was rescued by a British
officer.

Soon after his capture he was exchanged, and promoted to the rank of
colonel. He joined the American armies as chief of staff to the
major-general commanding, and being about the only man in the army who
had any knowledge of tactical manuals and military treatises
generally, he was kept busy from morning till night in organizing the
staff service, drilling the officers, and the like. These duties,
however, did not interfere with his leading and commanding his troops
in battle. He led the advance guard in the successful assault on Fort
George in May, 1813, took part in a number of skirmishes, and served
with gallantry in Wilkinson's unsuccessful campaign.

Early in the spring of 1814 a camp of instruction for officers and men
was formed, with Scott in command, near Buffalo. Up to this time the
imbecility of the administration (and of the people whom the
administration represented) in not preparing for the war, had been
well matched by the supineness with which they carried it on. During
the eighteen months that had elapsed since the beginning of the
contest, only the navy, built by the Federalists when in power fifteen
years before, had saved the country from complete disgrace, the armies
generally being utterly inadequate in number, and moreover models of
all that troops ought not to be. Even in 1814 this remained true of
the forces intrusted with the defence of the Capital itself; but on
the northern frontier Scott, and his immediate superior, Brown, by
laborious work succeeded in turning the inefficient m