oked for now and again; but these phenomena would come in by way of
fluctuating variations from the authentic routine, rather than as
systematic features of it.
That superfluity of naughtiness that has given character to the current
German Imperial policy in Belgium, e.g., or that similarly has
characterised the dealings of Imperial Japan in Korea during the late
"benevolent assimilation" of that people into Japanese-Imperial
usufruct, is not fairly to be taken to indicate what such an Imperial
establishment may be expected to do with a subject people on a footing
of settled and long-term exploitation. At the outset, in both instances,
the policy of frightfulness was dictated by a well-advised view to
economy of effort in reducing the subject people to an abject state of
intimidation, according to the art of war as set forth in the manuals;
whereas latterly the somewhat profligate excesses of the government of
occupation--decently covered with diplomatic parables on benevolence and
legality--have been dictated by military convenience, particularly by
the need of forced labor and the desirability of a reduced population in
the acquired territory. So also the "personally conducted" dealings with
the Armenians by use of the Turks should probably also best be explained
as an endeavour to reduce the numbers of an undesirable population
beforehand, without incurring unnecessary blame. All these things are,
at the most, misleading indications of what the Imperial policy would be
like under settled conditions and in the absence of insubordination.
By way of contrast, such as may serve to bring the specific traits of
this prospective Imperial tutelage of nations into a better light, the
Ottoman usufruct of the peoples of the Turkish dominions offers an
instructive instance. The Ottoman tutelage is today spoken of by its
apologists in terms substantially identical with the sketches of the
future presented by hopeful German patriots in the early months of the
current war. But as is so frequently the case in such circumstances,
these expressions of the officers have to be understood in a diplomatic
sense; not as touching the facts in any other than a formal way. It is
sufficiently evident that the Ottoman management of its usufruct has
throughout been ill-advised enough persistently to charge more than the
traffic would bear, probably due in great part to lack of control over
its agents or ramifications, by the central office. Th
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