sm. The disorders and miseries, which result, gradually
incline the minds of men to seek security, and repose in the absolute
power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing
faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this
disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of Public
Liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless
ought not to be entirely out of sight), the common and continual
mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest
and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

It serves always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeeble the
Public Administration. It agitates the Community with ill-founded
jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one party against
another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door
to foreign influence and corruption which find a facilitated access to
the Government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the
policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will
of another.

There is an opinion, that parties in free countries are useful checks
upon the administration of the Government, and serve to keep alive the
spirit of Liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in
Governments of a Monarchical cast, Patriotism may look with indulgence,
if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of a popular
character, in Governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be
encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always
be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And, there being
constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public
opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it
demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest,
instead of warming, it should consume.

It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country
should inspire caution in those intrusted with its administrations, to
confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres,
avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach
upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers
of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of
Government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power, and
proneness to abuse it,