and even those few have
many other things to consider besides capturing their adversary's king.
Not only would it have been impossible for England to have attacked
Germany under such circumstances; but if France had done so England
could not have assisted her, and might even have been compelled by
public opinion to intervene by way of a joint protest from England and
America, or even by arms, on her behalf if she were murderously pressed
on both flanks. Even our Militarists and diplomatists would have had
reasons for such an intervention. An aggressive Franco-Russian hegemony,
if it crushed Germany, would be quite as disagreeable to us as a German
one. Thus Germany would at worst have been fighting Russia and France
with the sympathy of all the other Powers, and a chance of active
assistance from some of them, especially those who share her hostility
to the Russian Government. Had France not attacked her--and though I am
as ignorant of the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance as Sir Edward
Grey is strangely content to be, I cannot see how the French Government
could have justified to its own people a fearfully dangerous attack on
Germany had Russia been the aggressor--Germany would have secured fair
play for her fight with Russia. But even the fight with Russia was not
inevitable. The ultimatum to Servia was the escapade of a dotard: a
worse crime than the assassination that provoked it. There is no reason
to doubt the conclusion in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's despatch (No. 161)
that it could have been got over, and that Russia and Austria would have
thought better of fighting and come to terms. Peace was really on the
cards; and the sane game was to play for it.

*The Achilles Heel of Militarism.*

Instead, Germany flew at France's throat, and by incidentally invading
Belgium gave us the excuse our Militarists wanted to attack her with the
full sympathy of the nation. Why did she do this stupid thing? Not
because of the counsels of General von Bernhardi. On the contrary, he
had warned her expressly against allowing herself to be caught between
Russia and a Franco-British combination until she had formed a
counterbalancing alliance with America, Italy, and Turkey. And he had
most certainly not encouraged her to depend on England sparing her: on
the contrary, he could not sufficiently admire the wily ruthlessness
with which England watches her opportunity and springs at her foe when
the foe is down. (He little knew, poor