substance,--much less follow its escape from the organic matter in which
the principle of thought ceases with the principle of life. When the
metaphysician, contending for the immortality of the thinking faculty,
analyzes Mind, his analysis comprehends the mind of the brute, nay, of
the insect, as well as that of man. Take Reid's definition of Mind, as
the most comprehensive which I can at the moment remember: 'By the mind
of a man we understand that in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, and
wills.(1) But this definition only distinguishes the mind of man from
that of the brute by superiority in the same attributes, and not by
attributes denied to the brute. An animal, even an insect, thinks,
remembers, reasons, and wills.(1) Few naturalists will now support the
doctrine that all the mental operations of brute or insect are to
be exclusively referred to instincts; and, even if they do, the word
'instinct' is a very vague word,--loose and large enough to cover an
abyss which our knowledge has not sounded. And, indeed, in proportion as
an animal like the dog becomes cultivated by intercourse, his instincts
grow weaker, and his ideas formed by experience (namely, his mind), more
developed, often to the conquest of the instincts themselves. Hence,
with his usual candour, Dr. Abercrombie--in contending 'that everything
mental ceases to exist after death, when we know that everything
corporeal continues to exist, is a gratuitous assumption contrary to
every rule of philosophical inquiry'--feels compelled, by his reasoning,
to admit the probability of a future life even to the lower animals.
His words are: 'To this anode of reasoning it has been objected that it
would go to establish an immaterial principle in the lower animals which
in them exhibits many of the phenomena of mind. I have only to answer,
Be it so. There are in the lower animals many of the phenomena of
mind, and with regard to these, we also contend that they are entirely
distinct from anything we know of the properties of matter, which is all
that we mean, or can mean, by being immaterial.'(2) Am I then driven to
admit that if man's mind is immaterial and imperishable, so also is that
of the ape and the ant?"

"I own," said Faber, with his peculiar smile, arch and genial, "that if
I were compelled to make that admission, it would not shock my pride.
I do not presume to set any limit to the goodness of the Creator; and
should be as humbly pleased as the India