hers might be added, it is clear that
the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients nor
wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. The true distinction
between these and the American governments, lies IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION
OF THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITY, from any share in the
LATTER, and not in the TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PEOPLE from the administration of the FORMER. The distinction,
however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous
superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this
advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it
from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot
be believed, that any form of representative government could have
succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of
Greece.

In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by
examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of
the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a
senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of
six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the
government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.

To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient, that
liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the
abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former as
well as of the latter; and that the former, rather than the latter,
are apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. But a more
particular reply may be given.

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be
observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the
State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and
must finally corrupt the people at large. It is evident that the Senate
must be first corrupted before it can attempt an establishment of
tyranny. Without corrupting the State legislatures, it cannot prosecute
the attempt, because the periodical change of members would otherwise
regenerate the whole body. Without exerting the means of corruption with
equal success on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that
coequal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt;
and without corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new
representatives would speedily res