DS THE
WHOLE FABRIC OF THE CONSTITUTION IN ONE INDISSOLUBLE BOND OF UNITY AND
AMITY." Her constitution accordingly mixes these departments in several
respects. The Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department,
is also a judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. The
President, who is the head of the executive department, is the presiding
member also of the Senate; and, besides an equal vote in all cases,
has a casting vote in case of a tie. The executive head is himself
eventually elective every year by the legislative department, and
his council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same
department. Several of the officers of state are also appointed by the
legislature. And the members of the judiciary department are appointed
by the executive department.

The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less
pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental article of liberty.
It declares "that the legislative department shall never exercise the
executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them;
the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers,
or either of them." This declaration corresponds precisely with the
doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been explained, and is not in a
single point violated by the plan of the convention. It goes no farther
than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the
powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is
prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The executive
magistrate has a qualified negative on the legislative body, and the
Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a court of impeachment
for members both of the executive and judiciary departments. The members
of the judiciary department, again, are appointable by the executive
department, and removable by the same authority on the address of the
two legislative branches. Lastly, a number of the officers of government
are annually appointed by the legislative department. As the appointment
to offices, particularly executive offices, is in its nature an
executive function, the compilers of the Constitution have, in this last
point at least, violated the rule established by themselves.

I pass over the constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, because
they were formed prior to the Revolution, and even bef