ect vouchers in abundance from the
records and archives of every State in the Union. But as a more concise,
and at the same time equally satisfactory, evidence, I will refer to the
example of two States, attested by two unexceptionable authorities.

The first example is that of Virginia, a State which, as we have
seen, has expressly declared in its constitution, that the three great
departments ought not to be intermixed. The authority in support of it
is Mr. Jefferson, who, besides his other advantages for remarking the
operation of the government, was himself the chief magistrate of it. In
order to convey fully the ideas with which his experience had impressed
him on this subject, it will be necessary to quote a passage of some
length from his very interesting Notes on the State of Virginia, p. 195.
"All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same
hands, is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be
no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of
hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots
would surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it, turn their
eyes on the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, that they
are chosen by ourselves. An ELECTIVE DESPOTISM was not the government we
fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles,
but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced
among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their
legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the
others. For this reason, that convention which passed the ordinance of
government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative,
executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct,
so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at
the same time. BUT NO BARRIER WAS PROVIDED BETWEEN THESE SEVERAL POWERS.
The judiciary and the executive members were left dependent on the
legislative for their subsistence in office, and some of them for their
continuance in it. If, therefore, the legislature assumes executive and
judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can
be effectual; because in that case they may put their proceedings into
the form of acts of Assembly, which will render them obligatory on the
other branches. Th