borrowing
money.

Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil
society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The
powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the
federal councils.

Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this
question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter
into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes
this power in the most ample form.

Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This
is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of
self-defense.

But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as
well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well as
in WAR?

The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another
place to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer
indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such
a discussion in any place. With what color of propriety could the force
necessary for defense be limited by those who cannot limit the force
of offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set
bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it
prudently chain the discretion of its own government, and set bounds to
the exertions for its own safety.

How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited,
unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and
establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only
be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact,
be ever determined by these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to
oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation.
It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself
necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ
of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains
constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or
revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach
of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions. The fifteenth
century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of
peace. They were introduced by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has
followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the example not been
followed by other