e possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics
tells us nothing about the world: but what does tell us something about
it is the precise way in which it is possible to describe it by these
means. We are also told something about the world by the fact that it
can be described more simply with one system of mechanics than with
another.

6.343 Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan
all the true propositions that we need for the description of the world.

6.3431 The laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still
speak, however indirectly, about the objects of the world.

6.3432 We ought not to forget that any description of the world by means
of mechanics will be of the completely general kind. For example, it
will never mention particular point-masses: it will only talk about any
point-masses whatsoever.

6.35 Although the spots in our picture are geometrical figures,
nevertheless geometry can obviously say nothing at all about their
actual form and position. The network, however, is purely geometrical;
all its properties can be given a priori. Laws like the principle of
sufficient reason, etc. are about the net and not about what the net
describes.

6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following
way: There are laws of nature. But of course that cannot be said: it
makes itself manifest.

6.361 One might say, using Hertt:'s terminology, that only connexions
that are subject to law are thinkable.

6.3611 We cannot compare a process with 'the passage of time'--there is
no such thing--but only with another process (such as the working of a
chronometer). Hence we can describe the lapse of time only by relying on
some other process. Something exactly analogous applies to space: e.g.
when people say that neither of two events (which exclude one another)
can occur, because there is nothing to cause the one to occur rather
than the other, it is really a matter of our being unable to describe
one of the two events unless there is some sort of asymmetry to be
found. And if such an asymmetry is to be found, we can regard it as the
cause of the occurrence of the one and the non-occurrence of the other.

6.36111 Kant's problem about the right hand and the left hand, which
cannot be made to coincide, exists even in two dimensions. Indeed, it
exists in one-dimensional space in which the two congruent figures,
a and b, cannot be made