ely akin to this rule is another, namely, that an erroneous
description of the thing bequeathed does not invalidate the bequest;
for instance, if a testator says, 'I give and bequeath Stichus my born
slave,' the legacy is good, if it quite clear who is meant by Stichus,
even though it turn out that he was not born the testator's slave, but
was purchased by him. Similarly, if he describe Stichus as 'the slave
I bought from Seius,' whereas in fact he bought him from some one else,
the legacy is good, if it is clear what slave he intended to give.

31 Still less is a legacy invalidated from a wrong motive being assigned
by the testator for giving it: if, for instance, he says, 'I give and
bequeath Stichus to Titius, because he looked after my affairs while I
was away,' or 'because I was acquitted on a capital charge through his
undertaking my defence,' the legacy is still good, although in point of
fact Titius never did look after the testator's affairs, or never did,
through his advocacy, procure his acquittal. But the law is different
if the testator expresses his motive in the guise of a condition, as: 'I
give and bequeath such and such land to Titius, if he has looked after
my affairs.' 32 It is questioned whether a legacy to a slave of the
heir is valid. It is clear that such a legacy is void if given
unconditionally, even though the slave ceases to belong to the heir
during the testator's lifetime: for a legacy which would be void if
the testator died immediately after making his will ought not to become
valid by the simple fact of the testator's living longer. Such a legacy,
however, is good if given subject to a condition, the question then
being, whether at the vesting of the legacy the slave has ceased to
belong to the heir.

33 On the other hand, there is no doubt that even an absolute legacy
to the master of a slave who is instituted heir is good: for, even
supposing that the testator dies immediately after making the will, the
right to the legacy does not necessarily belong to the person who is
heir; for the inheritance and the legacy are separable, and a different
person from the legatee may become heir through the slave; as happens
if, before the slave accepts the inheritance at his master's bidding,
he is conveyed to another person, or is manumitted and thus becomes heir
himself; in both of which cases the legacy is valid. But if he remains
in the same condition, and accepts at his master's bidding, the leg