milar to that of Kant. He stands, or rather
moves, between the old world and the new, and is broken into
inconsistency by the effort of transition. Like Kant, he is embarrassed
to the end by the ideas with which he started, and of which he can
never free himself so as to make a new beginning. Comte had only a small
portion of that power of speculative analysis which characterized his
great predecessor, but he had much of his tenacity of thought, his power
of continuous construction; and he had the same conviction of the
all-importance of morals, and the same determination to make all his
theoretic studies subordinate to the solution of the moral problem.
Also, partly because he lived at a later time, and in the midst of a
society which was in the throes of a social revolution, and partly
because of the keenness and strength of his own social sympathies, he
gives us a kind of insight into the diseases and wants of modern
society, which we could not expect from Kant, and which throws new light
upon the ethical speculations of Kant's idealistic successors. To
believe that his system, as a whole, is inconsistent with itself, that
his theory of historical progress is insufficient, and that his social
ideal is imperfect, need not prevent us from recognizing that there are
many valuable elements in his historical and social theories, and that
no one who would study such subjects can afford to neglect them. A mind
of such power cannot treat any subject without throwing much light upon
it, which is independent of his special system of thought, and, above
all, without doing much to show what are the really important
difficulties in it which need to be solved. And, especially in such
subjects, to discover the right question is to be half-way to the
answer. Further, as Comte himself somewhere says, it is an immense
advantage in studying any complex subject to have before us a distinct
and systematic attempt to explain it; for it is only by criticism upon
criticism that we can expect to reach the truth, in which all its varied
sides and aspects are brought to a unity.

EDWARD CAIRD.

FOOTNOTES:

[26] "Comte and Positivism," p. 140.

[27] "The Unity of Comte's Life and Doctrine," p. 28.

[28] Pol. Pos. iii. p. 419. I quote from the translation.

[29] Pol. Pos. iii. p. 71.

[30] Pol. Pos. iii. p. 218.

[31] Ibid. iii. p. 365.

[32] Pol. Pos. iii. p. 348.

[33] Ibid. iii. p. 383.

[34] Ibid. iii. p. 376.

[35] Ibid.