depends on the nature of the world.
If I am antecedently assured that the world is good, I shall naturally
rejoice on hearing that it is advancing from a less to a more complete
state of itself. But if the nature of the world is evil, what reason can
I possibly have for rejoicing in its evolution? Assuming the world to be
evil in its essential nature, I for my part, if I were consulted in the
matter, would certainly give my vote against its being allowed to
advance from a less to a more complete state of itself. The less such a
world progresses the easier it will be for moral beings to live in it.
Our interest lies in its remaining as undeveloped as possible.

Obvious as this seems there are some evolutionists who take a rather
different view. They seem to think that any sort of world, no matter
what its nature might be, would ultimately become a good world if it
were allowed to develop its nature far enough. It is just the fact of
its continually becoming more of itself that makes it good. But this
would compel us to abandon our definition that progress is the advance
of a thing from a less to a more complete state of _itself_. For if
itself were a bad self to begin with all such advance of _itself_ would
only make it worse. It is possible that an essentially bad man like Iago
might be converted into a good one, but not by advancing from a less to
a more complete state of _himself_ as he originally was--unless indeed
we change the hypothesis and suppose that he was not essentially bad to
begin with. So with the world at large. Our nature being what it is,
namely moral, we must first be convinced that the world is in principle
good before we can derive the least satisfaction from knowing that it is
advancing from a less to a more complete state of _itself_. The
alternative doctrine makes a breach in the doctrine of progress which is
inconsistent with its original form. A thing develops by retaining its
essential nature--that is the original form. But a bad world which
develops into a good one doesn't retain its essential nature. There
comes a point somewhere when the next step of progress can be achieved
only by the thing dropping its original nature--a point at which the
thing is no longer becoming more of its former self, which was bad, but
is ceasing to be its former self altogether and becoming something else,
which is good.

Let us apply this to progress in three specific directions--Science, the
Mechanical Arts,