iver forty miles below Tiptonville. A
mile below Tiptonville begin the great swamps, extending down both
sides of the Mississippi for a distance of sixty miles. The enemy
therefore had the river in his front, and behind him a swamp,
impassable to any great extent for either men or supplies in the then
high state of the river. The only way of receiving help, or of
escaping, in case the position became untenable, was by way of
Tiptonville, to which a good road led. It will be remembered that
between New Madrid and Point Pleasant there is a low ridge of land,
rising from one to fifteen feet above overflow.

As soon as New Madrid was reduced, General Pope busied himself in
establishing a series of batteries at several prominent points along
the right bank, as far down as opposite Tiptonville. The river was
thus practically closed to the enemy's transports, for their gunboats
were unable to drive out the Union gunners. Escape was thus rendered
impracticable, and the ultimate reduction of the place assured; but
to bring about a speedy favorable result it was necessary for the army
to cross the river and come upon the rear of the enemy. The latter,
recognizing this fact, began the erection of batteries along the shore
from the island down to Tiptonville.

On the 15th of March the fleet arrived in the neighborhood of Island
No. 10. There were six ironclads, one of which was the Benton carrying
the flag-officer's flag, and ten mortar-boats. The weather was
unfavorable for opening the attack, but on the 16th the mortar boats
were placed in position, reaching at extreme range all the batteries,
as well on the Tennessee shore as on the island. On the 17th an attack
was made by all the gunboats, but at the long range of two thousand
yards. The river was high and the current rapid, rendering it very
difficult to manage the boats. A serious injury, such as had been
received at Henry and at Donelson, would have caused the crippled boat
to drift at once into the enemy's arms; and an approach nearer than
that mentioned would have exposed the unarmored sides of the vessels,
their most vulnerable parts, to the fire of the batteries. The fleet
of the flag-officer was thought none too strong to defend the Upper
Mississippi Valley against the enemy's gunboats, of whose number and
power formidable accounts were continually received; while the fall of
No. 10 would necessarily be brought about in time, as that of Fort
Pillow afterward was, by