sequence, they had resigned, and
it had in other hands been carried through, would the Americans
have accepted the measure cheerfully and readily--would it for a
long time to come have closed the breach, and cemented the union
with the Mother Country? From all the facts and testimonies then
or since made public, I answer without hesitation that it would.
The sword was then slumbering in its scabbard. On both sides there
were injuries to redress, but not as yet bloodshed to avenge. It
was only a quarrel. It was not as yet a war. Even the boldest
leaders of that war in after years, whether in council or the
field, were still, in January, 1775, the firm friends of colonial
subordination. Washington himself (and he at least was no
dissembler--from him, at least, there never came any promise or
assurance that did not deserve the most implicit credit) had only
a few months before presided at a meeting of Fairfax County, in
Virginia. That meeting, while claiming relief of grievances, had
also at his instance adopted the following Resolve:--'That it is
our greatest wish and inclination, as well as interest, to
continue our connection with, and dependence upon, the British
Government.' But further still, although the first Congress was
praised by Chatham for its moderate counsels, and although the
calmer voice of history has ratified the praise, we learn that
these moderate counsels did not lag behind, but rather exceeded
and outran the prevailing sentiment in many of the colonies. To
this fact we find an unimpeachable testimony in the letters of
President Reed, who, writing to a friend in strict confidence,
laments that 'The proceedings of Congress have been pitched on too
high a key for some of those middle provinces.' With such
feelings, how gladly, how gratefully would they have welcomed the
hand of reconciliation stretched out by the Parliament of England!
It may be true, indeed, that such feelings as these did not
prevail in all, or nearly all, the colonies. It may be true,
especially, that no amount of good government, of forbearance, or
of kindness, would have won back Massachusetts. But herein lay, as
I think, the especial force and efficacy of Lord Chatham's scheme,
that it did not refer the questions of parliamentary supremacy and
colonial taxation to the decision of any one pr