ts produced by the late American war, we shall find
little that is likely to flatter our vanity or increase our
self-importance. Except a few successes in Canada at its very
commencement, and the brilliant inroad upon Washington, it will
be found that our arms have been constantly baffled or repulsed
on shore; whilst at sea, with the exception of the capture of the
Chesapeake and one or two other affairs towards its conclusion,
we have been equally unsuccessful. From what cause does this
proceed? Not from any inferiority in courage or discipline,
because in these particulars British soldiers and sailors will
yield to none in the world. There must, then, be some other
cause for these misfortunes, and the cause is surely one which
has continually baffled all our plans of American warfare.

We have long been habituated to despise the Americans as an enemy
unworthy of serious regard. To this alone it is to be attributed
that frigates half manned were sent out to cope with ships
capable of containing them within their hulls; and to this also
the trifling handfuls of troops dispatched to conduct the war by
land. Instead of fifteen hundred, had ten thousand men sailed
from the Garonne under General Ross, how differently might he
have acted! There would have been then no necessity for a
reembarkation after the capture of Washington, and consequently
no time given for the defence of Baltimore; but, marching across
the country, he might have done to the one city what he did to
the other. And it is thus only that a war with America can be
successfully carried on. To penetrate up the country amidst
pathless forests and boundless deserts, and to aim at permanent
conquest, is out of the question. America must be assaulted only
on her coasts. Her harbours destroyed, her shipping burned, and
her seaport towns laid waste, are the only evils which she has
reason to dread; and were a sufficient force embarked with these
orders, no American war would be of long continuance.

A melancholy experience has now taught us that such a war must
not be entered into, unless it be conducted with spirit; and
there is no conducting it with spirit, except with a sufficient
numerical force. To the plan proposed of making desert the whole
line of coast, it may be objected, that by so doing we should
distress individuals, and not the Government. But they who offer
this objection, forget the nature both of the people whose cause
they plead,