of their visions. Yet we considered that we were
soldiers, and certainly no regret was experienced when we were
ordered to re-embark, and sail for the Downs.

REMARKS.

Having thus brought my narrative to a conclusion, I cannot lay
aside my pen without offering a few remarks upon the events of
this busy year, and the nature of an American war in general.
In doing so, I shall begin with the unfortunate attack upon New
Orleans, and endeavour, in as few words as possible, to assign
the true causes of its failure.

From the account which I have given of this affair, it will
appear that, from its very commencement, it was replete with
error, and gave promise of no better result than actually
occurred. I do not here allude to the spot fixed upon for
landing, because that was as appropriate as could be chosen.
Neither do I refer to the groundless rumours brought in by
deserters; for to such all assailants are liable; but the error
lay in the steps subsequently taken; in the unhappy advance of
the first division from a place of concealment into the open
country, without pushing forward to the extent required. The
fact is, that having reached the main land in safety, one out of
two plans might have been selected by General Keane; which, in
all probability, would have been equally attended with success.
Either he might have remained in the morass till the whole army
was assembled, or, if this were deemed too dangerous, he ought to
have advanced upon the city with the first division alone. If it
be objected that a force of 1600 men was incompetent for an
undertaking so important as the latter, I reply that there could
be no more hazard in it than in the course actually pursued. New
Orleans is not a regular fortification requiring a large army and
a powerful battering train for its reduction. In obtaining
possession of such a place there would have been no difficulty,
because it has since been ascertained that the American troops
were, at the time of our landing, some miles above the city; and
surely it would not have been more difficult to repulse an attack
within a town than in the open country. But neither of these
courses was adopted. The advance was drawn from concealment, and
halted just where it became most exposed, as if it had been our
design to warn the American General of his danger; the
consequence of which was a well-directed attack upon our bivouac,
and an immediate commencement of those works which afte