es
Medailles_.

The Persian generals endeavoured to make their means of attack
proportionate to the defences of the enemy. Acre was the only port in
Southern Syria large enough to form the rendezvous for a fleet, where it
might be secure from storms and surprises of the enemy. This was chosen
as the Persian headquarters, and formed the base of their operations.
During three years they there accumulated supplies of food and military
stores, Phoenician and Creek vessels, and both foreign and native
troops. The rivalries between the military commanders, Tithraustes,
Datames, and Abrocomas, and the intrigues of the court, had on several
occasions threatened the ruin of the enterprise, but Pharnabazus, who
from the outset had held supreme command, succeeded in ridding himself
of his rivals, and in the spring of 374 B.C. was at length ready for
the advance. The expedition consisted of two hundred thousand Asiatic
troops, and twenty thousand Greeks, three hundred triremes, two hundred
galleys of thirty oars, and numerous transports. Superiority of numbers
was on the side of the Persians, and that just at the moment when
Nectanebo lost his most experienced general. Artaxerxes had remonstrated
with the Athenians for permitting one of their generals to serve in
Egypt, in spite of their professed friendship for himself, and, besides
insisting on his recall, had requested for himself the services of the
celebrated Iphicrates. The Athenians complied with his demand, and while
summoning Chabrias to return to Athens, despatched Iphicrates to Syria,
where he was placed in command of the mercenary troops. Pharnabazus
ordered a general advance in May, 374 B.C.,* but when he arrived before
Pelusium, he perceived that he was not in a position to take the town
by storm; not only had the fortifications been doubled, but the banks of
the canals had been cut and the approaches inundated. Iphicrates advised
him not to persevere in attempting a regular siege: he contended that it
would be more profitable to detach an expeditionary force towards some
less well-protected point on the coast, and there to make a breach in
the system of defence which protected the enemies' front.

* As Kenrick justly observes, "the Persian and Athenian
generals committed the same mistake which led to the defeat
of Saint Louis and the capture of his army in 1249 A.D., and
which Bonaparte avoided in his campaign of 1798." Anyhow, it
seem