her
way than by the war of national defense.

That the foregoing Manifesto expressed the position of the vast majority of
Russian Socialists there can be no doubt whatever. Between this position
and that of the Porazhentsi with their doctrine that Russia's defeat by
Germany was desirable, there was a middle ground, which was taken by a not
inconsiderable number of Socialists, including such able leaders as Paul
Axelrod. Those who took up this intermediate position were both
anti-Czarists and anti-German-imperialists. They were pro-Ally in the large
sense, and desired to see the Allies win over the Central Empires, if not a
"crushing" victory, a very definite and conclusive one. But they regarded
the alliance of Czarism with the Allies as an unnatural marriage. They
believed that autocratic Russia's natural alliance was with autocratic
Germany and Austria. Their hatred of Czarism led them to wish for its
defeat, even by Germany, provided the victory were not so great as to
permit Germany to extend her domain over Russia or any large part of it.
Their position became embodied in the phrase, "Victory by the Allies on the
west and Russia's defeat on the east." This was, of course, utterly
unpractical theorizing and bore no relation to reality.

V

Thanks in part to the vigorous propaganda of such leaders as Plechanov,
Deutsch, Bourtzev, Tseretelli, Kerensky, and many others, and in part to
the instinctive good sense of the masses, support of the war by Socialists
of all shades and factions--except the extreme Bolsheviki and
the so-called "Internationalist" sections of Mensheviki and
Socialist-Revolutionists--became general. The anti-war minority was
exceedingly small and had no hold upon the masses. Had the government been
both wise and honestly desirous of presenting a united front to the foe,
and to that end made intelligent and generous concessions to the democratic
movement, it is most unlikely that Russia would have collapsed. As it was,
the government adopted a policy which could not fail to weaken the military
force of the nation--a policy admirably suited to German needs.

Extremes meet. On the one hand there were the Porazhentsi Socialists,
contending that the interests of progress would be best served by a German
victory over Russia, and plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the
Russian army and to stir up internal strife to that end. On the other hand,
within the royal court, and throughout the bu