ge that
this underhand political manipulation gave her in their own home field that
stirred up the leaders of the capitalist class of Russia. That, and the
knowledge that German intrigue by promoting divisions in Russia was the
mainstay of the autocracy, solidified the capitalist class of Russia in
support of the war. There was a small section of this class that went much
farther than this and entertained more ambitious hopes. They realized fully
that Turkey had already fallen under the domination of Germany to such a
degree that in the event of a German victory in the war, or, what really
amounted to the same thing, the submission of the Entente to her will,
Germany would become the ruler of the Dardanelles and European Turkey be in
reality, and perhaps in form, part of the German Empire.

Such a development could not fail, they believed, to have the most
disastrous consequences for Russia. Inevitably, it would add to German
prestige and power in the Russian Empire, and weld together the
Hohenzollern, Habsburg, and Romanov autocracies in a solid, reactionary
mass, which, under the efficient leadership of Germany, might easily
dominate the entire world. Moreover, like many of the ablest Russians,
including the foremost Marxian Socialist scholars, they believed that the
normal economic development of Russia required a free outlet to the warm
waters of the Mediterranean, which alone could give her free access to the
great ocean highways. Therefore they hoped that one result of a victorious
war by the Entente against the Central Empires, in which Russia would play
an important part, would be the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia.
Thus the old vision of the Czars had become the vision of an influential
and rising class with a solid basis of economic interest.

III

As in every other country involved, the Socialist movement was sharply
divided by the war. Paradoxical as it seems, in spite of the great revival
of revolutionary hope and sentiment in the first half of the year, the
Socialist parties and groups were not strong when the war broke out. They
were, indeed, at a very low state. They had not yet recovered from the
reaction. The manipulation of the electoral laws following the dissolution
of the Second Duma, and the systematic oppression and repression of all
radical organizations by the administration, had greatly reduced the
Socialist parties in membership and influence. The masses were, for a long
time, we