ted the possibility of some
part of our squadron getting round; and as, from his own experience,
he was certain any of our ships that might arrive in the South Seas
must be in a very weak and defenceless condition, he advised the
viceroy to send what ships of war he had to the southwards, in order
to be secure at all events, where, in all probability, they would
intercept us singly, before we had an opportunity of touching any
where for refreshment; in which case he had no doubt of our proving an
easy conquest. The viceroy approved this advice, and as he had already
fitted out four ships of force at Callao, one of 50 guns, two of 40
each, and one of 24, which were intended to have joined Pizarro, three
of these were stationed off the port of Conception, and one at the
island of Juan Fernandez, where they continued cruising for us till
the 6th of June; and then, conceiving it impossible that we could
have kept the sea so long, they quitted this station and returned to
Callao, fully persuaded we must either have perished, or been driven
back.

Now, as the time when they left Juan Fernandez was only a few days
before our arrival at that island, it is evident, if we had made it
on our first search, without hauling in for the main to secure our
easting, a circumstance we then considered as very unfortunate, on
account of the many men we lost by our long continuance at sea; had
we made the island 28th of May, when we first expected to see it, and
were in reality very near to have so done, we had inevitably fallen in
with some part of the squadron from Callao; and in our then distressed
condition, the encounter of a healthy and well-provided enemy might
have proved fatal, not only to us in the Centurion, but also to the
Tryal, Gloucester, and Anna pink, which separately joined us, and were
each less capable to have resisted than we. I may also add, that these
Spanish ships, sent out to intercept us, had been greatly shattered by
a storm during their cruise, and had been laid up after their
return to Callao; and we were assured by our prisoners, that, when
intelligence might be received at Lima of our being in the South Seas,
it would require two months at least, before this armament could
be refitted for going to sea. The whole of this intelligence was as
favourable as we, in our reduced circumstances, could wish for; and
we were now at no loss to account for the broken jars, ashes, and fish
bones, which we had observed at Ju