miting it to a cause-effect
relation [Footnote ref 1].

In early Nyaya books three kinds of inference are described,
namely purvavat, s'e@savat, and samanyato-d@r@s@ta. Purvavat is the
inference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from
heavy dark clouds; s'e@savat is the inference of causes from effects,
e.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river; samanyato-d@r@s@ta
refers to the inference in all cases other than those of
cause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the
tamarind from its form and colour. _Nyayamanjari_ mentions
another form of anumana, namely paris'e@samana (_reductio ad
absurdum_), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. consciousness)
of any other thing (e.g. atman), because it was already
definitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any
other part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to
anything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of
these variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely
that of the inference of the probandum (_sadhya_) by virtue of the
unconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called
the vyapti-niyama. In the new school of Nyaya (Navya-Nyaya)
a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an
important place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalanvayi, and
kevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the
vyapti has been observed by a combination of a large number of
instances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence,
as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever
there is smoke there is fire (_anvaya_), and where there is no fire,
there is no smoke (_vyatireka_)). An inference could be for one's
own self (_svarthanumana_) or for the sake of convincing others
(_pararthanumana_). In the latter case, when it was necessary that
an inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner,
live propositions (_avayavas_) were regarded as necessary, namely
pratijna (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), udahara@na
(where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen),
upanaya (this hill has smoke), niga@mana (therefore it has got

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[Footnote 1: Vatsyaya@na's bhasya, Udyotakara's _Varttika_ and
_Tatparyya@tika,_ I.i. 5.]

354

fire). Kevalanvayi is that type of inference, the vyapti of which
could not be based on any negative instance, as in the case
"this o