y rooted in the mind that
the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the
presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any
smoke is seen. Prabhakara counts separately the fallacies of the
minor (_pak@sabhasa_), of the enunciation (_pratijnabhasa_) and of
the example (_d@r@s@tantabhasa_) along with the fallacies of the middle
and this seems to indicate that the Mima@msa logic was not altogether
free from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke
includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there
would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential
cognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhakara,
for he does not admit that a prama@na should necessarily bring
us any new knowledge, for prama@na is simply defined as "apprehension."
So though the inferential cognition always pertains to
things already known it is yet regarded by him as a prama@na,
since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension.

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[Footnote 1: See _S'lokavarttika, Nyayaratnakara, S'astradipika,
Yuktisnehapura@ni, Siddhantacandrika_ on anumana.]

[Footnote 2: On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is
no condition (_upadhi_) which may vitiate the inference, Prabhakara has
nothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in
a large number of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must say
that it does not exist (_prayatnenanvi@syama@ne aupadhikatvanavagamat_,
see _Prakara@napancika_, p. 71).]

391

Upamana, Arthapatti.

Analogy (_upamana_) is accepted by Mima@msa in a sense which
is different from that in which Nyaya took it. The man who
has seen a cow (_go_) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox
(_gavaya_), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with
the _go,_ and then cognizes the similarity of the _go_ (which is not
within the limits of his perception then) with the _gavaya._ The
cognition of this similarity of the _gavaya_ in the _go,_ as it follows
directly from the perception of the similarity of the _go_ in the
_gavaya,_ is called upamana (analogy). It is regarded as a separate
prama@na, because by it we can apprehend the similarity
existing in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is
not mere remembrance, for at the time the _go_ was seen the
_gavaya_ was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen,
and what was not seen could not be