.
This is in complete agreement with the general Vedanta metaphysics.
The early Vedantists were more interested in demonstrating the illusory
nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory.
It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as
worked out by Dharmarajadhvarindra he was largely indebted to the Mimam@sa
school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamana s'abda and
anupalabdhi also Dharmarajadhvarindra accepted the Mimam@sa view. The
Vedantins, previous to Dharmarajadhvarindra, had also tacitly followed
the Mimam@sa in these matters.]

471

prama@na is to be defined as the means that leads to such right
knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge
(_prama_) in Vedanta is the knowledge of an object which has not
been found contradicted (_abadhitarthavi@sayajnanatva_). Except
when specially expressed otherwise, prama is generally considered
as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired
(_anadhigata_) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections
are sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a
few minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive
moments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired
in the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedanta
considers that so long as a different mental state does not arise,
any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as
remaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive
one thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a
series of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledge
of the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledge
of the preceding moments, for so long as any mental
state has any one thing for its object it is to be considered as
having remained unchanged all through the series of moments.
There is of course this difference between the same percept of a
previous and a later moment following in succession, that fresh
elements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though
the content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned
remains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses
though the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed.
When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state
representing the book is not changed every second, and hence
there can be no _such supposition_ that I am having separate mental
states in succession each of wh