s of time, space,

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[Footnote 1: Vedanta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The
same anta@hkara@na, according to its diverse functions, is called manas,
buddhi, aha@mkara, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called
manas, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As
presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness aha@mkara, and as
producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications
or states (v@rtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special
kind of modification of ajnana as anta@hkara@na).]

473

etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary
and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajnana forms
so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the
subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on
the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation
(_abheda_) of the subjective consciousness with the objective
consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the
specific mental states
(_tattadindriyayogyavi@sayavacchinnacaitanyabhinnatvam
tattadakaravi@sayavacchinnajnanasya tattadams'e pratyak@satvam_).
This union in perception means that the objective has at that
moment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of
the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the anta@hkara@na
is called jivasak@si.

Inference (_anumana_), according to Vedanta, is made by our
notion of concomitance (_vyaptijnana_) between two things, acting
through specific past impressions (_sa@mskara_). Thus when I see
smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke
with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I
infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and
the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance
revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between
the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is
generated by the perception of two things together, when no
case of the failure of concomitance is known (_vyabhicarajnana_)
regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether
subjective, the Vedantist does not emphasize the necessity
of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (_bhuyodars'anam
sak@rddars'anam veti vis'e@so nadara@niya@h_). Vedanta is
not anxious to establish any material validity for