the
relationing of the energy with a thing. Nyaya strongly opposes this
doctrine of a non-sensible (atindriya) energy and seeks to explain all
action by actual molecular motion.]

403

no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot
be any contact (_sa@myoga_) or inherence (_samavaya_) of dharma
and adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannot
have any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like
the carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the
world either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the
beginning there were no beings towards whom should he be
actuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself
require a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator,
no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been
running the same, without any new creation or dissolution, s@r@s@ti
or pralaya.

Mima@msa as philosophy and Mima@msa as ritualism.

From what we have said before it will be easy to see that
Mima@msa agrees in the main with Vais'e@sika about the existence
of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities,
rupa, rasa, etc. Kumarila's differences on the points of jati,
samavaya, etc. and Prabhakara's peculiarities have also been
mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that
Kumarila was influenced by Sa@mkhya thought rather than by
Nyaya. Sa@mkhya and Vais'e@sika are the only Hindu systems which
have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics;
other systems have generally followed them or have differed from
them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhakara and
Kumarila have thus but little importance, as they agree in
general with the Vais'e@sika view. In fact they were justified in not
laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance
of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyaya-Vais'e@sika about
the world was most suitable.

The main difference of Mima@msa with Nyaya consists of the
theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the
Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from
God, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any
other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity
of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the
advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated
to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and
there being nothing to contradict t